



OFFICIAL

# Performance Against Response Indicators

## Community Safety Committee

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Date: 14 July 2023

Agenda Item:

06

Submitted By: Director of Service Delivery

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<b>Purpose</b>	To inform Members of Community Safety Committee of the performance against the 2023 / 24 performance outcome targets. The report specifically looks at performance covering 01 April 23 – 19 June 2023.
<b>Recommendations</b>	That Members of the Community Safety Committee note the contents of the report.
<b>Summary</b>	Members of the Community Safety Committee are presented this report as part of an ongoing commitment to demonstrate how the service delivery activities undertaken by WYFRS contribute to 'Making West Yorkshire Safer'.

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Local Government (Access to information) Act 1972

Exemption Category: None

Contact Officer: Area Manager Scott Donegan  
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Background papers open to inspection: None

Annexes: None

## 1 Introduction

- 1.1 This performance report covers the period from 01 April 2023 to 19 June 2023
- 1.2 This is the first time OneView has been used to provide the performance update to Community Safety Committee members.
- 1.3 It is proposed that an overview commentary is provided for quarters' one and three.
- 1.4 Full commentaries against district performance will be provided by the five district commanders in quarters' two and four (6 and 12 monthly).

## 2 Information

- 2.1 The OneView system allows managers and staff to monitor incident activity using real time data sets. Incidents are plotted geographically which allows for the identification of trends and a more thorough understanding of what is driving the indicators.
- 2.2 The attached reports provide the data sets against the three year average for a range of incident types in 2023/24
- 2.3 Previous reports to Community Safety Committee considered ten key performance indicators. The new methodology will report against 9 more detailed key performance indicators. The comparison can be seen below:

Historic Key Performance Indicators	OneView Key Performance Indicators
*Arson	
*Arson Primary	Non fires
*Arson Secondary	Incident Demand
Actual Rescues	Victims Rescued
Total Activity	All Incidents
*Dwelling Fires	Fires
*Non-Domestic Fires	Injuries and Fatalities
Prevalence of False Alarms	False Alarms
Fire Related Injuries	Fire Related Injuries and Fatalities
Road Traffic Collisions	Road Traffic Collisions

\*These indicators are now reported under the Fire key performance indicator.

- 2.4 This report provides an update at service level. Performance reports at district level are included in the annexes and can be used to inform discussion with local district commanders.

### 3 Key Performance Indicators

- 3.1 **All Incidents** - In 2023 / 24 we have responded to 159 fewer incidents when compared to the three year average. Over the reporting period we have attended 35 more road traffic collisions (RTC) and six additional water rescues.
- 3.2 **Incident Demand** – The peak period for operational mobilisations is between 15:00 and 22:00. On average, operational demand over the weekend increases by 12% when compared to a weekday. However, it is positive to report 30 fewer accidental dwelling fires and 17 fewer non-domestic building fires.
- 3.3 Over the last reporting period we have seen a significant wildfire on Marsden Moor. Due to the location of the fire and the time it started, it is believed that the fire was a result of human intervention. Public Space Protection Orders are in place across much of our moorland; however, due to the scale of the moors, catching those responsible can prove challenging. As we continue to see longer, hotter, drier summers we will likely see and increase in the number of deliberate outdoor fires.
- 3.4 Response to these fires will continue to be reviewed through our community risk management planning. This has and will continue to influence the training, tactics and equipment used by service delivery teams.
- 3.5 **Fires** – We have responded to 2554 fires since 01 April 2023, this is 224 fewer than the three yearly average. 43% of all emergencies attended are fires. Deliberate outdoors fires account 1222 mobilisations. We have attended 195 accidental dwelling fires with single occupancy dwellings accounting for 128 of these incidents.
- 3.6 Between April and June 2023 firefighters have been trialling a data led approach to targeting the most vulnerable homes across the county. Early evaluation has shown positive results as firefighters are locating people considered more vulnerable to fire and undertaking an increased number of safe and well visits. It thought that pairing proactive data led direct approach with our existing referral pathways will reduce vulnerability in the home.
- 3.7 **Non-Fires** – Non fires were previously reported as Special Service Calls and include incident types such as effecting entry for partners, RTCs, lift rescues, technical rescues etc.
- 3.8 There have been 80 more mobilisations compared to the three year average and non-fires account for 17% of total operational demand. Over the reporting period, we have supported the Yorkshire Ambulance Service at 327 incidents, attended 142 RTCs, 49 lift rescues and 14 water rescues.
- 3.9 Following a response to support the Yorkshire Ambulance Service a Safe and well visit is undertaken at the earliest opportunity.
- 3.10 **False Alarms** – There have been 15 fewer false alarms attended compared to the three year average. False alarms are responsible for 40% of operational demand for this reporting period. The overwhelming majority of false alarms prove to be unwanted fire signals i.e. an actuation of a detection device due to fault, poor maintenance or careless behaviour.
- 3.11 This is an incident type which is currently being reviewed. Reducing the number of false alarms attending will provide significantly more time for operational training, prevention and protection work.

- 3.12 **Fire Related Injuries and Fatalities** – In this reporting period there have been 18 fire related injuries and three fire related fatalities. Of the injuries, two were considered severe, 11 were due to smoke inhalation, five people had minor burns and four were taken to hospital with minor injuries.
- 3.13 Fire investigation indicates two of the fatalities were a result of unsafe smoking and one was as a result of accidental ignition of clothing. All three individuals lived in Leeds.
- 3.14 **Injuries and Fatalities** – In this reporting period there have been 40 non-fire related fatalities. Four resulting from RTCs, 22 from effecting entry support to partners, three following removals from water courses, four from suspected suicide.
- 3.15 There have been 288 injuries of which the major contributors are 143 linked to RTCs and 123 linked to effecting entry and cause for concerns from members of the public.
- 3.16 **Victims Rescued** – Over the reporting period 255 people have been rescued by firefighters. 246 of these were by firefighter not wearing breathing apparatus. This demonstrates how the balance has shifted in terms of ‘fire’ compared to ‘rescue’ service. That said, the requirement to train operational to the highest standard of firefighting will always remain a key priority.
- 3.17 The majority of these rescues resulted from calls to support partner agencies and members of the public.
- 3.18 **Road Traffic Collisions** – There have been 143 RTCs in this reporting period, 36 more than the three year average. RTCs are responsible for 2% of the service’s overall operational demand. Of these RTCs 43 have required firefighters to employ full extrication techniques.
- 3.19 We continue to work in partnership with District Road Safety Partnership and the service is represented at the West Yorkshire Vision Zero Board. There is innovative prevention and education activities being undertaken across the districts and by the Youth Intervention Team with aim of tackling the fatal five and reducing RTCs.

## 4 Financial Implications

- 4.1 There are no financial implications resulting from this report.

## 5 Legal Implications

- 5.1 The Monitoring Officer has considered this report and is satisfied it is presented in compliance with the Authority’s Constitution

## 6 Human Resource and Diversity Implications

- 6.1 It has been identified through national datasets that higher levels of deprivation are a key factor in the occurrence of fire and other emergencies. By targeting prevention activities to those most vulnerable we are likely to support and reduce risk in the most diverse communities across the county.

## 7 Equality Impact Assessment

Are the recommendations within this report subject to Equality Impact Assessment as outlined in the EIA guidance? ( <a href="#">EIA</a> )	Yes / No
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<a href="#">guidance and form 2020 form.docx (westyorksfire.gov.uk)</a>	
Date EIA Completed	DD/MM/YY
Date EIA Approved	DD/MM/YY

The EIA is available on request from the report author or from [diversity.inclusion@westyorksfire.gov.uk](mailto:diversity.inclusion@westyorksfire.gov.uk)

## 8 Health, Safety and Wellbeing Implications

- 8.1 The health, safety and wellbeing of all WYFRS staff involved in responding to emergency incidents is one of the key priorities contained within the Your Fire and Rescue Service 2022-2025. The District Command teams actively monitor the health and safety of staff following incidents and have welfare provisions in place for any specific incident type where crews may witness distressing scenes with support available through local managers and the Occupational Health and Safety Unit.

## 9 Environmental Implications

- 9.1 Working in partnership has enabled WYFRS to relaunch the Bemooraware campaign to reduce the risk of wildfire across our moorland areas. This has proven extremely successful this summer in preventing significant wildfires and opened networks which we will use to improve our prevention and response activities in the future.
- 9.2 We will continue to monitor response activity related to climate change and through the CRMP process develop our operational response and prevention resource to manage the risk.

## 10 Your Fire and Rescue Service Priorities

- 10.1 This report links with the Community Risk Management Plan 2022-25 strategic priorities below:
- Improve the safety and effectiveness of our firefighters.
  - Plan and deploy our resources based on risk.
  - Focus our prevention and protection activities on reducing risk and vulnerability.
  - Collaborate with partners to improve all of our services.
  - Continuously improve using digital and data platforms to innovate and work smarter.

## 11 Conclusions

- 11.1 Members of the Community Safety Committee are presented this report as part of an ongoing commitment to demonstrate how the service delivery activities undertaken by WYFRS contribute to 'Making West Yorkshire Safer'





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# Wildfire Awareness

## Community Safety Committee

Date: 14 July 2023

Agenda Item:

07

Submitted By: Director of Service Delivery

<b>Purpose</b>	To update Community Safety Committee members on West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service's ability to respond to wildfires.
<b>Recommendations</b>	That Members note the content of this report.
<b>Summary</b>	The frequency, location and severity of wildfires is being monitored and in collaboration with partners, WYFRS will continue to develop its wildfire capability relative to risk.

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Local Government (Access to information) Act 1972

Exemption Category: None

Contact Officer: Area Manager Scott Donegan  
[Scott.Donegan01@westyorksfire.gov.uk](mailto:Scott.Donegan01@westyorksfire.gov.uk)

Background papers open to inspection: None

Annexes: None

# 1 Introduction

- 1.1 In 2022 / 23 the United Kingdom experienced its hottest summer in over 140 years and more than half of the UK's oldest active weather stations recorded their hottest day ever. On the 19 July the temperature rose above 40 degrees for the first time.
- 1.2 Fire services recorded over 24,316 wildfires in England from June to August 2022. This is almost four times the 6,213 in the equivalent period in 2021, and twice as many seen in June to August 2020.
- 1.3 In West Yorkshire, the service attended over 2000 more secondary fires in the period 01 June 2022 – 31 August 2022 compared to the previous year.
- 1.4 The National Fire Chiefs Council define a wildfire as a fire which:
- Involves a geographical area of at least one hectare (10,000 square metres)
  - Has a sustained flame length of more than 1.5 metres
  - Requires a committed resource of at least four fire and rescue service appliances/resources
  - Requires resources to be committed for at least six hours
  - Presents a serious threat to life, environment, property, and infrastructure
- 1.5 The purpose of this report is to demonstrate how West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service has responded to the merging threat posed by climate change related fires.

# 2 Information

- 2.1 Much of the moorland around West Yorkshire are considered to be Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and a Special Area of Conservation (SAC). This provided legislative protection due to the wildlife present across the landscape.
- 2.2 It was recognised over 10 years ago that a smarter, more response to moorland fires was needed to ensure fires were extinguished more rapidly, with less demand on resources. This had to be achieved whilst maintaining the health and safety of firefighters.
- 2.3 In 2010, the first specialist wildfire stations were established in West Yorkshire at Holmfirth, Todmorden and Keighley. Skelmanthorpe provided the resilience for the three primary stations The provision:

Primary Wildfire	Secondary Wildfire
Holmfirth Land Rover and Wildfire Unit	Skelmanthorpe Competent on primary wildfire equipment
Todmorden Land Rover, Argo and Wildfire Unit	
Keighley Land Rover and Wildfire Unit	

- 2.4 A wildfire unit consisted of a Land Rover with fogging unit and trailer containing equipment shown in appendix 1.
- 2.5 This was the primary provision in West Yorkshire until 2018 / 2019, the Community Risk Management Planning (CRMP) process identified a rising trend in wildfire mobilisations which were placing a significant demand on operational resources.
- 2.6 The CRMP identified an increased wildfire risk in Calderdale and Kirklees and led to further investment in specialist wildfire equipment such as blowers and 4x4 vehicles. The wildfire provision as of 2021:

Primary Wildfire	Secondary Wildfire	Wildfire Light
Holmfirth Land Rover and Wildfire trailer	Skelmanthorpe Competent on primary wildfire equipment carried on wildfire unit	Slaithwaite Polaris + Blower capability x3
Todmorden Land Rover, Argo and Wildfire trailer		Meltham 1x Blower
Keighley Land Rover and Wildfire trailer		Ilkley 1x Blower
		Mytholmroyd 1x Blower

2.7 Whilst developing our wildfire provision we have also fostered strong working relationships with partners and developed the award winning #BeMoorAware campaign.

- Extra Training for Partners
- Extra Training for WYFRS stations
- Public Space Protection Orders
- Drive bys by local station
- Working in partnership with partners Be moor aware

campaign was introduced.

- **Wildfire Advice**
- Call 999
- Enjoy open spaces
- Be aware of risks using fire outdoors
- Impact on community / WYFRS



2.8 This prevention has proven successful and reduced the number of larger wildfires we saw through 2018 and 2019.

2.9 As we continued to see an increase in weather related fires the service has continued to develop the wildfire capability and as of 2022 the service has nine wildfire stations:

Primary Wildfire 4x4 Capability	Secondary Wildfire Wildfire Unit Support	Wildfire Light
Holmfirth	Skelmanthorpe	Mytholmroyd
Todmorden	Slaithwaite	Meltham
Keighley	Halifax	Ilkley

2.10 2023 has seen the delivery of 2 new Argocats with all staff at Todmorden and Keighley successfully trained within 2 months of delivery and following feedback from staff regarding last year's fire season a number of additional purchases were made:

- 6 additional blowers were procured
- A second set of coveralls were purchased, allowing staff to launder dirty kit whilst still deployed to protracted incidents.
- Wildfire overalls are being purchased for all firefighters

2.11 We are early into the wildfire season and have already seen a significant incident on Marsden Moor. It is likely that the fire was started by human intervention, however, due to the scale of the landscape, catching the people responsible is challenging. Since April 2023, fire appliances have been committed to Marsden Moor for over 1300 hours.

2.12 Work currently being undertaken includes:

**Academic:**

- Smoke sensor project with National Trust
- Calderdale bog and wildfire risk evaluation (published Feb 23)
- Peak District National Park Wildfire Risk Assessment (published 22)
- The Emergency Project with Catalonia Bombers

**Media:**

- Continued delivery of Be Moor Aware campaign
- Screenhouse production for The One Show and National Geographical

## Collaboration:


- Peak District Fire Operations Group
- Lancashire Moor Fire Operations Group
- South Pennines Fire Operations Group
- Calderdale Moorland Group
- Peak District Moorland Group
- National Gamekeepers Association
- Moorland Association
- BASC Lets Learn Moor roadshow
- NFCC Wildfire Group
- Home Office IRS group
- Wildfire risk reduction group

2.13 As we expect to see climate driven fires become more common we are working to improve how we respond. To enable this, we are Identifying areas where this fire behaviour can be interrupted, this is key to limiting the potential of large-scale wildfires

2.14 A project has commenced in collaboration with Leeds University and key stakeholders to model wildfire risk across West Yorkshire which will lead to the development of an online wildfire risk mapping tool as a proof of concept.

2.15 Stakeholders will be able to weight different wildfire risk factors and investigate different land use scenarios (for example to reduce wildfire fuel loads) in order to understand their impact on overall risk.

2.16 In this way the tool will allow stakeholders to evaluate the components of wildfire risk, and potential mitigation strategies in order to inform land management decisions. Understanding these in turn will support WYFRS in delivering better wildfire interventions.



2.17 Additional funds have been budgeted to further develop our fleet of Utility Terrain Vehicles next year and to procure non specialist Firefighters with light weight PPE they can wear for vegetation fires in place of structural fire kit.

### **3 Financial Implications**

3.1 There has been significant investment in West Yorkshire Fire and Rescues Service's wildfire capability. However, there are no financial implications resulting from this report.

### **4 Legal Implications**

4.1 The Monitoring Officer has considered this report and is satisfied it is presented in compliance with the Authority's Constitution

### **5 Human Resource and Diversity Implications**

5.1 There are no human resource and diversity implication resulting from this report.

### **6 Equality Impact Assessment**

Are the recommendations within this report subject to Equality Impact Assessment as outlined in the EIA guidance? ( <a href="#">EIA guidance and form 2020 form.docx (westyorksfire.gov.uk)</a> )	No
Date EIA Completed	DD/MM/YY
Date EIA Approved	DD/MM/YY

The EIA is available on request from the report author or from [diversity.inclusion@westyorksfire.gov.uk](mailto:diversity.inclusion@westyorksfire.gov.uk)

### **7 Health, Safety and Wellbeing Implications**

7.1 The health, safety and wellbeing of firefighters is a key consideration when developing the wildfire capability. We will continue to improve the protective equipment provided to responders, develop operational tactics to improve effectiveness and where possible make the best use of new technology to reduce the risks present when tackling wildfires.

### **8 Environmental Implications**

8.1 Wildfire is a climate driven event, by improving how we respond we will reduce the release of greenhouse gases, support natural carbon capture and help protect West Yorkshire's SSSIs and SACs.

### **9 Your Fire and Rescue Service Priorities**

9.1 This report links with the Community Risk Management Plan 2022-25 strategic priorities below:

- Improve the safety and effectiveness of our firefighters.
- Promote the health, safety, and wellbeing of all our people.

- Encourage a learning environment in which we support, develop, and enable all our people to be at their best.
- Focus our prevention and protection activities on reducing risk and vulnerability.
- Collaborate with partners to improve all of our services.
- Work in a sustainable and environmentally friendly way.
- Continuously improve using digital and data platforms to innovate and work smarter.
- Plan and deploy our resources based on risk.

## **10 Conclusions**

- 10.1 The risk posed by wildfire is a major concern for West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service. We have responded quickly and proportionately since 2010 to improve our ability to manage this type of emergency.
- 10.2 The frequency, location and severity of wildfires is being monitored and in collaboration with partners and academic support, WYFRS will work innovatively to develop its wildfire capability relative to risk.

## Appendix 1 – Wildfire Unit



Contained in the 2010 units were:

- Beaters.
- FWP (x2)
- 3000 litre portable dam
- “Handbag” pumps (x3)





OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

# Manchester Arena Inquiry (MAI) Update

## Community Safety Committee

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Date: 14 July 2023

Agenda Item:

**08**

Submitted By: Deputy Chief Fire Officer/Director of Service Delivery

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<b>Purpose</b>	To provide the Community Safety Committee of an overview of the Manchester Arena Inquiry (MAI) reports and recommendations and set out the WYFRS response to these.
<b>Recommendations</b>	That Members of the Community Safety Committee note the contents of the report.
<b>Summary</b>	The paper provides a brief overview of the background to the MAI reports along with the work undertaken over the past few years and the work ongoing with regards to the MAI recommendations.

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Local Government (Access to information) Act 1972

Exemption Category: None

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Background papers open to inspection: None

Annexes: None

## 1 Introduction

- 1.1 On 22 May 2017 a devastating attack took place at Manchester Arena, the bomb killed twenty-two people including many children. Over one hundred were physically injured and many more suffered psychological and emotional trauma. Now, a little over 6 years on, the impact of the bomb continues to have a long-lasting effect on the victims' families, survivors, the firefighters, and other agencies that responded to it.
- 1.2 The attack was the deadliest in the UK since the London bombings on 7 July 2005. The Manchester Arena Inquiry (MAI), an independent public inquiry, was established on 22 October 2019 by the Home Secretary. The purpose of the MAI was to investigate the deaths of the victims of the attack. The Inquiry hearings commenced on 7 September 2020 and concluded 7 June 2023; it was Chaired by The Hon Sir John Saunders.
- 1.3 The MAI has published three reports, they can be found at the MAI website [here](#):
- Volume One: Security for the Arena (Published 17 June 2021).
  - Volume Two: Emergency Response (Published 3 November 2022).
  - Volume Three: Radicalisation and Preventability (Published 2 March 2023).

## 2 Information

- 2.1 This paper concentrates on Volume Two which addresses the response on the night of 22 May 2017. The key points and themes from MAI Volume 2 that impact the FRS, wider agencies and other blue light partners include:
- Previous tragedies had not resulted in necessary change or learning being implemented.
  - Each emergency service had drawn up plans, however, those plans were not known, nor were the plans as clear as they might have been, or they weren't put into practice. This was particularly the case with the knowledge and training of Op PLATO.
  - Whilst the initial response from Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and British Transport Police (BTP), had their staff on scene in in short timeframe, the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) response was more limited in the early stages, and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) were unfortunately absent for the vast majority of the incident.
  - Individual commanders and responders each worked hard in their own right, however, there was a lack of an effective multi-agency command structure and at times poor decision making with single points of failure, and little in the way of checks and balances.
  - The Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) failed Co-locate, Communicate, Co-ordinate, Jointly understand risk and Shared situational awareness. There was no co-location of commanders, no effective communication and a lack of coordination leading to a no joint understand of risk or shared situational awareness.
  - Inter-agency liaison and communications were poor at best and failed at worst.
  - The "Care Gap" is the term for the time lag between the emergency happening and the arrival of the emergency services that are able to assist the casualties. This is

a critical time when lives can be lost if no action is taken to save casualties, suitable numbers of adequately trained and equipped medical staff should be on hand to bridge the gap before the ambulance service and the fire and rescue service can arrive.

- First aid/trauma training for responders with suitable amounts of equipment should be in place, particularly for Police and Fire.
- Multi-agency training, testing, exercising and assurance must be improved and where lessons are identified, should be learnt from.
- Participation in Local Resilience Forum and the investment in contingency planning.

There are a total of 149 recommendations throughout the report, a number of individual recommendations are grouped together to create Monitored Recommendations (MR) that identify broader areas for improvement that cover an organisation or theme.

Organisations assigned MR's assigned to Greater Manchester Police (GMP), British Transport Police (BTP), North West Ambulance Service (NWAS), North West Fire Control (NWFC) and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) and the arena operator SMG.

The Thematic MR's cover Op PLATO (national identifier to the multi-agency response to a no notice marauding terrorist attack), Explosive Detection Dogs, First Aid, Triage Tools, other matters relating to Ambulance Services and event healthcare services at a national level.

Of the 149 Recommendations, those directly involving the FRS sector include:

- 8 recommendations for Fire Control.
- 4 recommendations for GMFRS.
- 2 recommendations for the wider FRS in general.
- 14 recommendations require HMICFRS action/input.
- A further 27 recommendations require multi-agency action, that all FRS should consider.

Note: 13 recommendations refer to the Fire Service College, this should read the NFCC (and has been raised and agreed that the NFCC is the most appropriate body for these to sit with).

It should be noted that there are very few direct FRS recommendations, this is due to the sad reality, that GMFRS did not attend the incident in a timely manner. We must consider that had they done so, the decision making, policies, procedures and guidance would have been scrutinised further, with many similar issues as has been identified with the Police and Ambulance decision making.

2.2 Prior to the MAI, there was the Kerslake Review, an independent review into the preparedness for, and emergency response to, the Manchester Arena attack. It was commissioned by the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham. The review did not draw conclusions about deaths of the victims or any criminal investigation, nor did it have official powers or status, therefore everyone who contributed did so voluntarily in a spirit of honesty and openness.

The Kerslake review identified the same broad areas as has been found within the MAI, therefore we have implemented changes to our policies, procedures, guidance,

training and equipment in the years between the original attack in May 2017, the publication of the Kerslake report in March 2018 and the Volume Two MAI in November 2022.

2.3 Following the publication of the Volume Two report, West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service (WYFRS) established a small project team to undertake a gap analysis to consider all of the MAI recommendations, identify those which impact us directly or indirectly, assign action owners, consider any financial impacts, and any other implications to the service. We consider 51 of the 149 recommendations have some bearing on WYFRS, each of these are captured and tracked within an action plan. Of which, 24 are considered fully compliant, 25 partially compliant and 2 are non-compliant. The non-compliant areas include:

- R57: basic trauma care to 999 Control operators.
- R116: Other emergency service personnel trained to driving ambulances.

It should be noted that the NFCC will shortly publish their requirements on which recommendations should be monitored, this may change the above numbers.

2.4 We continue to work on those areas that require closing this includes:

- Reviewing our capabilities, contingency plans and related processes against existing national Major Incident, JESIP, Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA) and Op PLATO guidance. Note: Op PLATO is the agreed national identifier to an ongoing Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA)
- Reviewing and testing processes in place for multi-agency call out procedures in the event of a Major Incident, particularly for out of hours command arrangements.
- Reviewing single service and multi-agency training, testing and exercising arrangements.
- Reviewing training arrangements for JESIP, Major Incident, MTA and Op PLATO with a focus on control rooms / duty officers and on-scene commanders.
- Reviewing first aid/trauma training and provision of equipment.

- 2.5 We are actively working with our West Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum partners to ensure that there is a joined up multi-agency approach to as many of the recommendations where we can. We also have a regional working group that pulls together the service leads on the MAI reviews for each of the Yorkshire and Humber FRS' to ensure that we share best practice and broaden the scope of the work covered.
- 2.6 The regional JESIP meeting structures also provides oversight and reassurance by including updates to/from regional partners including 4 Police forces, 4 fire services and YAS.
- 2.7 The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) have and continue to be engaged with National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC), National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU), Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) and Home Office on the multi-agency approach to major incidents and situational/operational awareness. The NFCC have established the Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations Oversight Group (MAIOG) to oversee the progress of the Volume 2 recommendations on behalf of the NFCC which feeds into national mechanisms of government and other multi-agency partners/leads. They have also created a new JESIP national lead and regional meeting structure to ensure best practice is shared throughout the FRS'.

### 3 Financial Implications

- 3.1 WYFRS are working within the existing confines of revenue and capital schemes. Where additional areas of spend are found, these will be costed and planned with our Finance team for future implementation, this may include staff costs, procurement of equipment and exercise planning.

### 4 Legal Implications

- 4.1 The Monitoring Officer has considered this report and is satisfied it is presented in compliance with the Authority's Constitution.

### 5 Human Resource and Diversity Implications

- 5.1 There have been limited Human Resource and Diversity implications to date within this project.

### 6 Equality Impact Assessment

Are the recommendations within this report subject to Equality Impact Assessment as outlined in the EIA guidance? ( <a href="#">EIA guidance and form 2020 form.docx (westyorkfire.gov.uk)</a> )	On-going
Date EIA Completed	N/A
Date EIA Approved	N/A

The EIA is available on request from the report author or from [diversity.inclusion@westyorkfire.gov.uk](mailto:diversity.inclusion@westyorkfire.gov.uk)

An EIA screen has been completed in March 2023, a full EIA is being completed at present, as the work within the project progresses. New equipment, policy, procedure or guidance will have individual EIA's completed on them within the development of each.

## **7 Health, Safety and Wellbeing Implications**

- 7.1 The updates within this report are intended to assure WYFRS and the Fire Authority that we are working to mitigate the risks to ourselves, our staff and the public of West Yorkshire.
- 7.2 Any proposed changes to training, equipment, guidance, policy or procedure will be undertaken in consultation with staff and representative bodies.
- 7.3 Increasing the provision of equipment, training, knowledge and understanding of MTA will reduce the risk to our staff and members of the public within West Yorkshire.

## **8 Environmental Implications**

- 8.1 There are limited environmental implications identified within this report.

## **9 Your Fire and Rescue Service Priorities**

- 9.1 This report links with the Community Risk Management Plan 2022-25 strategic priorities below;
- Improve the safety and effectiveness of our firefighters.
  - Encourage a learning environment in which we support, develop, and enable all our people to be at their best.
  - Provide ethical governance and value for money.
  - Collaborate with partners to improve all of our services.
  - Plan and deploy our resources based on risk.

## **10 Conclusions**

- 10.1 Following the publication of the Volume Two MAI report, WYFRS have undertaken the work to capture the evidence required to show how we comply with either partially or fully with the recommendations or where we are non-compliant. This sits within an action plan that is monitored and progressed locally within the service and with partners from the LRF, regionally various ongoing meeting structures and nationally by the NFCC. Whilst some recommendations are closed, others remain open and ongoing, we are making good progress towards completion of many of them.

## Appendix 1 – MEN Arena Volume 2 Recommendations

There are 149 recommendations in total, of these there are 75 Monitored Recommendations (MR)

### Monitored Recommendations (MR)

MR10 British Transport Police: Recommendations R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7

MR11 Greater Manchester Police: Recommendations R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13

MR12 North West Ambulance Service: Recommendations R14, R15, R16, R17, R18, R19, R20, R21, R22, R23, R24, R25, R26, R27

MR13 North West Fire Control: Recommendations R28, R29, R30, R31, R32, R33, R34, R35

MR14 Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service: Recommendations R36, R37, R38, R39

MR15 SMG: Recommendations R41, R42, R43, R44

MR16 Operation Plato: Recommendations R62, R63, R64, R65, R66

MR17 Use of explosives detection dogs: Recommendation R80

MR18 First aid: Recommendations R93, R94, R95, R96, R97

MR19 New triage tools: Recommendations R112, R113

MR20 Other matters relating to ambulance services: Recommendations R114, R115, R116, R117, R118, R119, R120, R121, R122, R123, R124, R125

MR21 Event healthcare services at a national level: Recommendations R132, R133, R134, R135, R136, R137, R138, R139

### **Part 1**

The following are the recommendations that have been initially assessed as being applicable to the WYFRS or are issues that WYFRS and the wider FRS may need to consider and are tracked by the NFCC and WYFRS Action Plan

### Greater Manchester Resilience Forum

**R1** (partially compliant): The Greater Manchester Resilience Forum should oversee, at least every six months, a regular tri-service review of the Major Incident plans used by Greater Manchester Police, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and North West Ambulance Service. The purpose of that review should be to ensure that there is a common understanding by each emergency service of the plans of the other emergency services. It should also ensure that the importance of joint working is embedded within each emergency service.

### Greater Manchester Police

**R9** (fully compliant): Greater Manchester Police's Major Incident Plan should be reviewed to ensure that it includes clear guidance on the capabilities of Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, including its Specialist Response Team, as well as on the importance of joint working.

### North West Ambulance Service

**R20** (fully compliant): North West Ambulance Service should ensure that non-specialist ambulance personnel are involved in multi-agency exercising.

### North West Fire Control

**R28** (fully compliant): North West Fire Control should take steps to ensure that it is involved in multi-agency exercises, particularly those that test mobilisation and the response to a Major Incident in line with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP).

**R29** (fully compliant): North West Fire Control should ensure that it regularly tests how it operates, by ensuring that its staff participate in regular exercises and practical tests. These should include multi-agency exercises.

**R30** (fully compliant): All North West Fire Control staff should be trained on the best practices for responding to a Major Incident, as identified through its participation in exercises. North West Fire Control should ensure that learning is kept under review.

**R31** (fully compliant): North West Fire Control should review the way it captures and records key information on its incident logs in order to ensure that the information is stored in one place and is readily accessible at all times by those who need it.

**R32** (fully compliant): Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and North West Fire Control should conduct a joint review of the circumstances in which it is appropriate for Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service personnel to check the North West Fire Control incident log. Policies should be written by both organisations to reflect the outcome of this review. Training should be delivered to embed it into practice.

**R33** (fully compliant): North West Fire Control should review its guidance and policies on how it receives and passes on information during a Major Incident. It is important that, for any update given, it is established when the last time the person receiving the update was provided with information, to ensure that they are completely up to date.

**R34** (fully compliant): North West Fire Control should review how it allocates the best-trained and most suitable Control Room Operators to roles during a Major Incident. It should consider whether it is beneficial to allocate a Control Room Operator to monitor communications on a multi-agency control room talk group and another Control Room Operator as the specific point of contact for the fire and rescue service. Both roles could be supervised by a Team Leader.

**R35** (fully compliant): North West Fire Control should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

### Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service

**R36** (partially compliant): Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should ensure that its commanders are adequately trained in the use of operational discretion.

**R37** (fully compliant): Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should review the policy by which the Incident Commander takes up the role, in light of the shortcomings I have identified in the policy in operation on 22nd May 2017.

**R38** (fully compliant): Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should review its guidance and policies on how it receives and passes on information during a Major Incident. It is important

that, for any update given, it is established when the last time the person receiving the update was provided with information, to ensure that they are completely up to date.

**R39** (partially compliant): Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

### SMG

**R41** (fully compliant): SMG should review its processes to ensure that it shares with Greater Manchester Police, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, British Transport Police and North West Ambulance Service its most current emergency response plans and policies for dealing with an incident at the Arena. It should apply this approach more generally to its operations.

### Joint Doctrine and Joint Operating Principles

**R45** (partially compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and JESIP should review and, as necessary, update the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework (the Joint Doctrine) and Responding to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack and Terrorist Siege: Joint Operating Principles for the Emergency Services (the Joint Operating Principles). The following matters should be considered in that review:

- a. achieving a situation in which commanders understand that the critical decisions of the commander most directly concerned in the issue under consideration are followed, unless there is a good reason for not doing so;
- b. achieving a situation in which risk appetite is common across the three emergency services – this will require collaborative work;
- c. achieving a situation in which forward deployment of specialist resources is the presumption, to be displaced only in the presence of a properly evidenced basis for not deploying resources forward;
- d. achieving a situation in which the possibility of a secondary device does not delay forward deployment of resources, unless there is a proper basis for believing that such a device exists.

**R46** (partially compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, individual police services and JESIP should review what changes need to be made to the Major Incident plans and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters Operation Plato guidance in order to achieve the aims set out in R45.

**R47** (partially compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unity, individual police services and JESIP should develop a nationally agreed format for all plans, placing JESIP at their centre.

### Multi-agency preparedness

**R48** (partially compliant): The Home Office and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should ensure that there exist robust national and local systems to identify and

record the lessons learned from all multi-agency exercises and ensure that change is implemented as a result, where change is indicated.

**R49** (partially compliant): The Home Office and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should ensure that there exist robust national and local systems and sufficient resources to make sure that the debrief process following multiagency exercises is effective to capture the lessons that need to be learned.

**R50** (partially compliant): The Home Office, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider introducing the use of regular 'high-fidelity training' to give emergency responders better experience of the stress, pressure and pace of a no-notice attack.

**R51** (partially compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and all local resilience forums should take steps to ensure, whether through multi-agency training and exercising or otherwise, that the members of each emergency service are aware of the specialist capabilities of every other emergency service.

**R52** (partially compliant): The Home Office, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, the College of Policing and the Fire Service College should develop guidance as to where commanders should locate during a spontaneous Major Incident. Steps should be taken to ensure that a consistent approach is taken so that equivalent commanders locate in the same place. During the response to a terrorist attack, the need for commanders on scene who are not engaged in directing individual actions should be recognised and accommodated.

#### Multi-agency communication

**R53** (fully compliant): The emergency services should prepare, train and exercise for how they will maintain effective radio communications between emergency responders on the ground, commanders and control rooms, during the response to a Major Incident.

**R54** (fully compliant): All police services should ensure that they have made adequate provision for Airwave Tactical Advisors, in particular that an identified Airwave Tactical Advisor is either on duty or on call at all times.

**R55** (partially compliant): The Home Office, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider together whether an app giving ready access to the contact details for all on-duty and on-call commanders is feasible and, if so, likely to be of benefit in the response to a Major Incident.

**R56** (fully compliant): The College of Policing and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should take steps to ensure that each police service establishes a hotline that enables those within the command structure of the three emergency services to make contact with the Force Duty Officer in the event of a declaration of Operation Plato.

**R57** (non-compliant): The College of Policing, the Fire Service College and National Fire Chiefs Council should consider devising training packages for operators within control rooms, to enable them to give guidance on basic trauma care to 999 callers.

**R58** (partially compliant): His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing and the Home Office should work together to put in place robust systems, policies and guidance to ensure that all police services have sufficient resources

dedicated to the development of operational and contingency plans, particularly for responding to Major Incidents, including terrorist attacks.

**R59** (partially compliant): His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing and the Home Office should issue guidance for all police services on how often operational plans for responding to a Major Incident, including a terrorist incident, should be reviewed, how that review should be conducted, and what rank and experience the officers involved should have.

### Common terminology

**R67** (fully compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and JESIP should ensure that all emergency services use common terminology to describe the Operation Plato hot, warm and cold zones and all have a common understanding of those terms.

**R68** (partially compliant): Those organisations should consider what changes need to be made to the Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters Operation Plato guidance in order to achieve those aims.

**R69** (fully compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and JESIP should ensure that all emergency services use common terminology to describe the zoning of hazardous areas in non-Operation Plato Major Incident situations and that all services have a common understanding of those terms. The terms should be different from those used when Operation Plato is declared.

**R70** (partially compliant): Those organisations should consider what changes need to be made to Major Incident plans in order to achieve those aims.

### Action cards

**R71** (partially compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should oversee the development and implementation of action cards for the police, fire and rescue service, and ambulance service for use in a Major Incident. This should include the following:

- a. ensuring that all control room staff and commanders are trained in the use of the action cards;
- b. ensuring that action cards act as a checklist, setting out the key functions of each command role, the role of control room staff and the need for joint working;
- c. ensuring that action cards are available immediately to commanders and control room staff during the course of the response to a Major Incident, whether in hard copy or electronically;
- d. ensuring that the use of action cards is tested regularly through exercising; and
- e. ensuring that the action cards within the control rooms include a prompt to the first commander on scene to co-locate with other emergency service commanders.

### Gold and Silver Control Rooms and Strategic Co-ordinating Group meetings

**R72** (partially compliant): Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should review the advantages and disadvantages of a combined Silver and Gold Control Room as opposed to separate rooms, and issue guidance for all police services on best practice.

**R73** (fully compliant): The Home Office should consider the introduction of a national standard requiring a meeting of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group to take place no more than two hours after the declaration of a Major Incident where more than one emergency service is engaged in the response to that incident.

**R80** (fully compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should take steps to ensure that all police services have in place effective systems for the prompt deployment of explosives detection dogs in circumstances in which such animals are needed.

**R81** (fully compliant): The Home Office, the College of Policing and His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services should develop a system for ensuring that the duty command structure in each police service has notice of any significant pre-planned event, such as a major concert or sports match, taking place within the police service area.

### Notification of pre-planned events

**R83** (fully compliant): The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, and the Fire Service College should develop a system for ensuring that the duty command structure in each fire and rescue service has notice of any significant pre-planned event, such as a major concert or sports match, taking place within the fire and rescue service area.

### Record-keeping

**R84** (partially compliant): The Home Office, the College of Policing, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Fire Service College should ensure that all those who may be required to take up a command position in the event of a Major Incident are issued with a means to record what they say, hear and see unless there are good reasons why they should not be so equipped.

**R85** (partially compliant): Consideration should also be given by those organisations to the provision of such equipment to key personnel within control rooms.

**R86** (partially compliant): The Home Office, the College of Policing, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Fire Service College should ensure that training is given to all who are issued with such equipment, on the circumstances in which it should be used and the importance of its use.

**R87** (partially compliant): The Home Office, the College of Policing, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Fire Service College should ensure that, in the course of exercises, such equipment is used by those who would use it in the circumstances of a real-life incident.

**R88** (partially compliant): The Home Office, the College of Policing, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Fire Service College should take steps to ensure that all emergency services understand the importance of promptly obtaining comprehensive accounts from commanders as part of the debrief process following a Major Incident.

### New triage tools

**R112** (partially compliant): The team led by Philip Cowburn has devised a tool that is designed to replace the existing systems of primary and secondary triage. It is known as the Major Incident Triage Tool. It already has the support of NHS England. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit and all ambulance services should consider introducing the Major Incident Triage Tool as a matter of urgency.

**R113** (partially compliant): The team led by Philip Cowburn has devised a tool that is designed for use by a wide range of emergency responders in a mass casualty situation. It is known as Ten Second Triage. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit, the College of Policing and the Fire Service College should consider as a matter of urgency whether all of their frontline staff should be trained in the use of Ten Second Triage.

**R116** (non-compliant): A significant issue in a mass casualty situation is that all of those paramedics who have arrived in ambulances may be required for the treatment of casualties, so that no paramedic is available to drive patients to hospital. The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider how to resolve that problem. Consideration should be given to the training of other emergency service personnel in driving ambulances.

### Fire and rescue services at a national level

**R130** (partially compliant): The National Fire Chiefs Council and the Fire Service College should establish a scheme for ensuring that all fire fighters are trained in first responder interventions.

**R131** (fully compliant): All fire and rescue services should consider appointing a person within their control rooms who, in the event of a Major Incident, has the sole role of gathering and collating all available information and intelligence, and sharing it internally and externally to the extent appropriate.

## **Part 2**

The below recommendations are those that fall outside of the WYFRS or NFCC remit and are being considered by partner agencies, local resilience forum, the government etc.

### British Transport Police

**R2** British Transport Police should ensure that all its Inspectors are trained to undertake the Bronze Commander role in the event of a Major Incident.

**R3** British Transport Police should review its procedures to ensure the prompt appointment of a Bronze Commander during a Major Incident.

**R4** British Transport Police should ensure that all its Sergeants are trained in what is required of a Bronze Commander in the event of a Major Incident. This will help to make sure that the first Sergeant on scene can undertake the initial steps in the emergency response, prior to the arrival of an Inspector.

**R5** British Transport Police should work with the Home Office police services with which it shares policing responsibilities at or for a particular location:

- a. to agree which police service has primacy in the event of a Major Incident;
- b. to put in place appropriate plans to make clear the responsibilities of each police service in the event of a Major Incident;
- c. to conduct regular exercises, including joint exercises, to test those plans; and
- d. to ensure that all police officers and police staff are adequately trained in what will be required of them.

**R6** The role of the Senior Duty Officer in a Major Incident should be clearly defined and explained in the British Transport Police Major Incident Manual. This role should have a corresponding action card.

**R7** British Transport Police should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

### Greater Manchester Police

**R8** Greater Manchester Police should ensure that its role cards are always immediately accessible to the officers who are to perform those roles.

**R10** Greater Manchester Police's Major Incident Plan should be reviewed to ensure that it includes clear guidance on the capabilities of North West Ambulance Service, including its Hazardous Area Response Team, Ambulance Intervention Team and Special Operations Response Team, as well as on the importance of joint working.

**R11** Greater Manchester Police should ensure that its plans for responding to a Major Incident, including a terrorist incident, are reviewed regularly by those with the appropriate skills and experience to make meaningful improvements to each plan. This must include a regular review of the Operation Plato plan, which must include obtaining the views of those with experience of firearms policing and of performing the role of Force Duty Officer.

**R12** Greater Manchester Police should review its Operation Plato plans to ensure that there is only a single plan to which all can work and that this plan gives clear and consistent guidance on how to respond to an Operation Plato incident.

**R13** Greater Manchester Police should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

### North West Ambulance Service

**R14** North West Ambulance Service should review its Major Incident Response Plan to consider whether it should be updated to include a pre-determined attendance for Major Incidents.

**R15** North West Ambulance Service should review its Major Incident Response Plan to consider whether, in order to speed up mobilisation, it should provide pre-determined attendances for the Hazardous Area Response Team, Ambulance Intervention Team and Special Operations Response Team crews for Major Incidents.

**R16** North West Ambulance Service should ensure that it has up-to-date site-specific plans for all large, complex or high-risk locations within its area.

**R17** North West Ambulance Service should ensure that all its site-specific plans are multi-agency and that all Category 1 responders operating in the areas it serves have contributed to them.

**R18** North West Ambulance Service should ensure that it has a policy that sets out the circumstances in which an Operational Commander may be relieved and how that should occur and be communicated to the outgoing Operational Commander and beyond.

**R19** North West Ambulance Service should train its Operational Commanders on the appropriate practice for relieving another of command and being relieved of command.

**R21** North West Ambulance Service should review its Major Incident Response Plan to make clear that the first resource on scene should assume the role of Operational Commander only once they have achieved situational awareness.

**R22** North West Ambulance Service should ensure that its commanders are adequately trained in the use of operational discretion.

**R23** North West Ambulance Service should review its policies for mobilising the Hazardous Area Response Team resource, to ensure that this team is available as soon as possible for an emergency where its specialist skills are required.

**R24** North West Ambulance Service should review how it rosters Tactical Advisors and National Interagency Liaison Officers so as to ensure that there is adequate geographical coverage enabling those on duty to arrive promptly at the scene of any Major Incident.

**R25** North West Ambulance Service should review the number of Tactical Advisors and National Interagency Liaison Officers it has, and whether the number of such specialists, both generally and on call, should be increased.

**R26** North West Ambulance Service should review its procedures with local NHS trusts to ensure that it has effective policies in place for quickly dispatching patients injured in a Major Incident to an appropriate hospital.

**R27** North West Ambulance Service should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

#### Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters

**R40** Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review the procedures by which it is notified of a terrorist attack to ensure that all police services know that this is an early priority.

#### SMG

**R42** SMG should ensure that the healthcare service provider at the Arena has a strong working relationship with North West Ambulance Service.

**R43** SMG should ensure that the healthcare service provider at the Arena has adequate staffing and skill levels for every event at that location.

**R44** SMG should review its approach to the provision of healthcare service equipment at the Arena to ensure that adequate equipment is always available.

#### Planning by police services

**R60** All police services should ensure that they have robust version control arrangements in place for all plans.

## The funding of police services

**R61** The Inquiry heard evidence that the impact of public funding cuts fell disproportionately hard on metropolitan police services, such as Greater Manchester Police, compared with non-metropolitan services. In the event that public funding cuts are in the future considered necessary by the government, the Home Office should consider whether some funding arrangement for police services different from that applied in the post-2010 period is necessary.

## Operation Plato

**R62** The Home Office, the College of Policing and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should ensure that all police officers to be appointed to the role of Force Duty Officer or Force Incident Manager attend a comprehensive training course dedicated to Operation Plato before they take up their role. Such courses must ensure that those attending understand the exceptional demands that will be placed upon them in the event of an Operation Plato declaration. Any course should include training in the following:

- a. the need, following a declaration of Operation Plato, to carry out regular reviews of that declaration;
- b. the need to identify with clarity the Operation Plato zones at the scene or scenes covered by the declaration;
- c. the need to communicate those zones to all emergency services promptly;
- d. the need to keep zoning decisions under review;
- e. the need to work jointly with emergency service partners in the response to an Operation Plato situation.

**R63** Given the broad command responsibilities that the Force Duty Officer or Force Incident Manager will have in the early stages of the response to a Major Incident, the Home Office and the College of Policing should develop nationally accredited training to prepare those officers for that role.

**R64** Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should ensure that all firearms officers, including firearms commanders, receive adequate training in Operation Plato, including in what such a declaration means and the demands it will place upon them. This should include instruction in the importance of zoning, communicating zoning decisions to other emergency services and joint working with those other services in the course of the response to an Operation Plato situation.

**R65** Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should ensure that all unarmed frontline police officers receive training in what Operation Plato is and what will be expected of them following such a declaration. The training should include the importance of zoning, the identification of who can ordinarily work in different zones and the importance of joint working.

**R66** The College of Policing should issue guidance to all police services to ensure the following, in the event of a Major Incident:

- a. The Force Duty Officer is not expected to deal with media enquiries.
- b. The important task of ensuring that the media is kept informed is done in a way that does not interfere with the work of the police control room.

### Embedding medics with police firearms officers

**R74** Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review the evidence heard during the Inquiry, including that heard in restricted sessions, to consider the advantages and disadvantages of embedding doctors with some police firearms teams, and how, if that is advantageous, it could be achieved.

**R75** Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review the experience of other jurisdictions that embed medics with police firearms officers, such as Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion (RAID) in France, to understand how their systems operate and whether they ought to be replicated in the UK or some further learning taken from them.

### Role of air ambulance services

**R76** The Department of Health and Social Care, the NHS, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, ambulance service trusts, Air Ambulances UK, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and JESIP should consider whether air ambulances should be integrated into the emergency response to Major Incidents, including terrorist attacks, and, if so, how that is to be achieved.

**R77** The Department of Health and Social Care, the NHS, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, ambulance service trusts, Air Ambulances UK, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and JESIP should consider what staff training and resources would be required to integrate air ambulance organisations into the emergency response to Major Incidents, including terrorist attacks.

### Police command structure

**R78** Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should issue guidance on the circumstances in which a police officer or officers with responsibility for the tactical/silver command of the unarmed officers at the scene or scenes of a Major Incident should deploy to that scene or scenes.

**R79** The College of Policing and His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services should ensure that each police service has in place a system that means appropriately qualified and experienced personnel are rostered 24 hours each day so that, in the event of a terrorist attack or any Major Incident, a prepared and effective command structure can be geared up swiftly.

### Notification of pre-planned events

**R82** The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should develop a system for ensuring that the duty command structure in each ambulance service has notice of any significant pre-planned event, such as a major concert or sports match, taking place within the ambulance service area.

### Record-keeping

**R89** The College of Policing should assess whether delays in the provision of written accounts by some firearms officers involved in the response to the Attack were due to Post-Incident Procedures. If so, those procedures should be reviewed.

**R90** The Home Office, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should consider whether firearms officers should be equipped routinely with body-worn video cameras.

#### Police training and training records

**R91** The Home Office and College of Policing should ensure that any police officer whose position carries with it the expectation that they will assume a Tactical/Silver Commander role in the event of a spontaneous Major Incident (e.g. Night Silver in Greater Manchester Police) has undertaken an accredited course preparing them for that role.

**R92** The College of Policing should consider whether the current process for maintaining and storing training records for all police officers can be improved. That should include assessing the following:

- a. the introduction of electronic training records in a standard form across all police services;
- b. the introduction of centrally held electronic training records for all police officers; and
- c. the introduction of a system whereby each police officer is required to view their record each year and identify any errors or omissions within it.

#### First aid

**R93** The Home Office and College of Policing should ensure that all newly recruited and existing police officers and all frontline police staff, such as Police Community Support Officers, are trained in first responder interventions.

**R94** Each police service must ensure that adequate time is allocated to the training of all police officers and frontline police staff in first responder interventions.

**R95** The Home Office and the College of Policing should regularly assess and appraise the training on first responder interventions provided by each police service to ensure that it is of an appropriate quality and that adequate time is allocated to it.

**R96** The College of Policing and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should ensure that all firearms officers are trained to understand that, while their primary role in an Operation Plato situation is to neutralise any armed terrorist, their role also involves providing Care Under Fire.

**R97** The College of Policing and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review whether firearms officers should be deployed with analgesia and trained in its use, as part of providing Care Under Fire.

#### Local resilience forums at a national level

**R98** Local resilience forums have a vital role in the preparation for the response to any Major Incident. The Cabinet Office and the Home Office should consider implementing an independent inspection regime for local resilience forums.

**R99** Each emergency service should ensure that it is represented at a senior level at every meeting of a local resilience forum.

**R100** Local resilience forums should monitor attendance and participation at their meetings, and flag promptly any concerns about attendance by members to the leadership of the organisation concerned. The Home Office should ensure that this is being done by local resilience forums.

**R101** The Home Office should consider empowering the leadership of local resilience forums to compel the attendance of a senior representative of its Category 1 and Category 2 responders at all local resilience forum meetings. Inspections by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services should include an analysis of a service's engagement with its local resilience forum or forums. Consideration should be given to putting this on a statutory footing.

**R102** The Home Office should consider how local resilience forums are to be funded consistently and sufficiently to enable them to do their important work.

**R103** The Home Office should consider, together with local resilience forums, how they are to have sufficient staff and resources to enable them to function effectively.

**R104** Local resilience forums should establish procedures to ensure that they oversee the process of identifying the lessons to be learned from major exercises, or serious incidents, in their areas, and that they are responsible for overseeing the debriefing of those events.

#### Ambulance services at a national level

**R105** Ambulance service trusts should review their capacity to respond to a mass casualty incident. That should include an assessment of whether they have an adequate number of trained specialist personnel to respond effectively to a mass casualty incident.

**R106** Having carried out that review, the trusts should make recommendations to their NHS commissioners about the additional and/or different resources they require in order to ensure that they are able to respond effectively to a mass casualty incident in the numbers required.

**R107** The Department of Health and Social Care should give urgent and close consideration to any recommendations made by the trusts and the NHS commissioners.

#### Hazardous Area Response Team (HART)

**R108** The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should develop procedures to ensure that, so far as possible, each ambulance service trust is able to deploy or call upon HART resources immediately in the event of a Major Incident. As part of that, the Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should develop procedures to ensure that, so far as possible, each ambulance service trust can call upon cross-border support in respect of HART resources immediately in the event of a Major Incident. There may be some incidents that are so significant that an individual ambulance service will need to mobilise its own HART resources and also draw upon cross-border support. Procedures need to accommodate this.

**R109** All ambulance service trusts should undertake training and exercising with neighbouring ambulance service trusts to ensure that cross-border support is efficient and effective.

**R110** The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should ensure that all ambulance commanders receive regular Major Incident training. The training should include training on HART capabilities, on all the command roles and where they will be located, on how to gain situational awareness through the deployment of sector commanders and other roles, on the importance of getting ambulance personnel to casualties without delay and on the circumstances in which they may use operational discretion.

**R111** The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider ensuring that there is further training of HART personnel so that at least one

member on every HART deployment has the ability to deliver the most enhanced care interventions.

#### Other matters relating to ambulance services

**R114** The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider whether the Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System is fit for purpose and, if it is, whether it can be improved. Particular consideration should be given to how the system prioritises emergency calls.

**R115** The Department of Health and Social Care, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care, the College of Paramedics and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should review the current model for evacuation to hospital operated in the UK by reference to the different approaches around the world in order to see whether triage at different times and in different places remains best practice, or whether there should be a greater emphasis on rapid evacuation to hospital.

**R117** The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider whether the Basic Life Support and Advanced Life Support bags used by paramedics should contain SMART Triage Tags or an equivalent.

**R118** The Department of Health and Social Care and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) should consider urgently whether the regulatory regime should be altered to enable analgesia, such as fentanyl lozenges or sufentanil sublingual tablets, to be given by paramedics to injured persons.

**R119** If the decision is that the regulatory regime should be altered in this way, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider urgently whether the use of such analgesia should be rolled out to all Hazardous Area Response Team and other specialist operatives, as part of their basic equipment, and to paramedics more generally.

**R120** The Department of Health and Social Care, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care, the College of Paramedics and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider whether all Hazardous Area Response Team operatives should be deployed with freeze-dried plasma and trained in its use.

**R121** The Department of Health and Social Care, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care, the College of Paramedics and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should undertake a review into whether frontline ambulances should carry intramuscular tranexamic acid or TXA.

**R122** The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should review whether stretchers should be carried on National Capability Mass Casualty Equipment Vehicles.

**R123** The Department of Health and Social Care, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care, the College of Paramedics and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider issuing guidance on how to ensure that specialist paramedics take with them, into a warm zone, equipment that enables them to carry out bridging interventions.

**R124** All ambulance service trusts should consider appointing a person within their control rooms who, in the event of a Major Incident, has the sole role of gathering and collating all available information and intelligence, and sharing it internally and externally to the extent appropriate.

**R125** The terms Casualty Collection Point and Casualty Clearing Station are capable of being confused, one for the other, particularly in circumstances of stress. That happened on the night

of the Attack. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider whether different and more distinct terms should be used for these two locations.

### Ambulance Liaison Officers

**R126** The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider the scope of the role of an Ambulance Liaison Officer and issue guidance to ambulance services in that regard.

**R127** The Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care should consider how the threshold for a requirement that an Ambulance Liaison Officer be present at an event is to be identified.

**R128** The Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider how to ensure that the role of an Ambulance Liaison Officer is properly resourced and also whether venue operators should fund the presence of an Ambulance Liaison Officer where one is required.

**R129** The Home Office should consider how the presence of an Ambulance Liaison Officer in appropriate circumstances may be made mandatory. This may need to be put on a statutory footing.

### Event healthcare services at a national level

**R132** The Department of Health and Social Care should establish the standard for the level of healthcare services required at events. Consideration should be given to putting that standard on a statutory footing.

**R133** That standard needs to be regulated and enforced. The Care Quality Commission is the appropriate body to provide regulation and enforcement. The Department of Health and Social Care should give urgent consideration to making the necessary changes in the law to enable the Care Quality Commission to become the regulator for this sector.

**R134** The Department of Health and Social Care together with the Care Quality Commission should consider what the consequences of breaching the appropriate standard should be. That should include consideration of whether the sanction should be criminal in nature.

**R135** The Department of Health and Social Care and the Care Quality Commission should consider introducing guidelines to ensure that all event healthcare staff who work at events are trained in first responder interventions.

**R136** The Department of Health and Social Care should consider issuing guidance on the first aid equipment that event providers should have available on the relevant premises, as well as where that equipment should be stored to ensure that it is readily accessible when required and how often it should be checked to ensure that it is up to date and in good working order.

**R137** The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should review the guidance given to all licensing authorities on the decisions they make in relation to venues that hold events, and on what level of event healthcare services may be required at the events likely to be held at those venues. The guidance should indicate appropriate licence conditions to be used. The licensing authorities should then impose conditions accordingly or make those standards a requirement of meeting existing conditions.

**R138** The Home Office should consider whether the requirement for adequate healthcare provision at events is a topic that should also be addressed by the Protect Duty.

### Event healthcare services at a national level

**R139** Guidance should be provided to event healthcare providers, to emergency service responders other than paramedics and to the public generally about the circumstances in which those who are believed to be dead should be covered. The guidance should make clear that this step should only be taken by a paramedic or other healthcare professional. The guidance should also make clear that paramedics at the scene of a mass casualty incident should inform others present that only healthcare professionals should cover those believed to be dead. The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should provide guidance addressing this important issue.

### Security Industry Authority

**R140** The Security Industry Authority should take urgent steps to devise a training scheme in first responder interventions that educates all of those licensed by it, both existing licensees and new licence applicants. The Security Industry Authority may find it helpful to consult with the College of Policing in this, since it is apparent that the College of Policing has already undertaken a good deal of work in this regard.

**R141** The Security Industry Authority should take steps to encourage the security industry generally to ensure that even those members of staff who do not require a licence from the Security Industry Authority develop skills in basic trauma care.

### The public

**R142** As of September 2020, all primary and secondary school pupils were required to be taught health education, including first aid, as part of the National Curriculum. This involves children aged over 12 being taught CPR. This is necessary. The Department for Education should ensure that it continues.

**R143** The Department for Education should consider extending the National Curriculum to ensure that pupils, once of an appropriate age, receive education in all first responder interventions.

**R144** The Home Office should consider the introduction of a public education programme to educate the public in first responder interventions.

**R145** The Home Office should consider the introduction of a requirement into law, for example through regulations issued under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, that employers train all employees, or certain categories of employees, in first responder interventions.

### Public Access Trauma kits

**R146** The Department of Health and Social Care should take steps to ensure that Public Access Trauma kits contain the equipment that is necessary to enable first responder interventions to be undertaken.

**R147** The Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care should consider how to ensure Public Access Trauma kits are available in all locations where they are most likely to be needed.

## Stretchers

**R148** The Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Care, the Department for Transport and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should conduct a review to ensure that stretchers that are appropriate in design and adequate in numbers are always available for use by the emergency services and in appropriate locations in the event of a mass casualty incident.

**R149** The Department of Health and Social Care should undertake a review, with input from other bodies as the Department considers appropriate, in order to identify the type of stretcher that is of the greatest utility in the event of a mass casualty incident. The product of that research should be rolled out to all of those with responsibility for the response to a mass casualty incident, including a terrorist attack, whether in the public or private sector.





OFFICIAL

# Spotlight On Reports

## Community Safety Committee

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Date: 14 July 2023

Agenda Item:

09

Submitted By: Director of Service Delivery

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<b>Purpose</b>	To provide Members with examples of how the service meets the needs of vulnerable people within the community in its service delivery functions of prevention, protection and response.
<b>Recommendations</b>	That Members of the Community Safety Committee note the contents of this report
<b>Summary</b>	The 'Spotlight On' case studies highlight just some of the excellent work that is being delivered across the communities of West Yorkshire.

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Local Government (Access to information) Act 1972

Exemption Category: None

Contact Officer: AM Service Delivery - Scott Donegan  
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Background papers open to inspection: None

Annexes: Spotlight On Reports

## 1 Introduction

- 1.1 WYFRS is committed to meeting the needs of West Yorkshire's diverse communities. Members are aware that we direct our resources particularly towards the most vulnerable groups and individuals who are most at risk because of their lifestyles, behaviours or the way their protected characteristics, such as race, or religion or belief, influence their day-to-day life.
- 1.2 The Spotlight On case studies allow the Service to demonstrate to Members of the Community Safety Committee how we often go above and beyond in order to provide an excellent service to the people of West Yorkshire and keep vulnerable people safe.

## 2 Information

- 2.1 The cases attached to this report showcase how our staff are working across districts in order to reduce risk and where required, respond to emergencies to provide a first class service to people in their time of need.

## 3 Financial Implications

- 3.1 There are no financial implications arising from this report. The activities carried out in the development of the work described come from existing revenue budgets and are supporting through collaboration with key partners.

## 4 Legal Implications

- 4.1 The Monitoring Officer has considered this report and is satisfied it is presented in compliance with the Authority's Constitution

## 5 Human Resource and Diversity Implications

There are no Human Resource Implications arising from this report.

## 6 Equality Impact Assessment

Are the recommendations within this report subject to Equality Impact Assessment as outlined in the EIA guidance? ( <a href="#">EIA guidance and form 2020 form.docx (westyorksfire.gov.uk)</a> )	<u>No</u>
Date EIA Completed	DD/MM/YY
Date EIA Approved	DD/MM/YY

## 7 Health, Safety and Wellbeing Implications

- 7.1 The activities described demonstrate our commitment to improving the health, safety and wellbeing of target groups across the respective districts. All activities have been fully risk assessed and where necessary control measures implemented.

## **8 Environmental Implications**

- 8.1 Several the risks highlighted in these documents could potentially have a significant impact on the environment locally and service wide, the plans show we have considered these risks and the actions we will take to mitigate the impact.

## **9 Your Fire and Rescue Service Priorities**


- 9.1 This report links with the Community Risk Management Plan 2022-25 strategic priorities below;

- Improve the safety and effectiveness of our firefighters.
- Promote the health, safety, and wellbeing of all our people.
- Encourage a learning environment in which we support, develop, and enable all our people to be at their best.
- Focus our prevention and protection activities on reducing risk and vulnerability.
- Provide ethical governance and value for money.
- Collaborate with partners to improve all of our services.
- Work in a sustainable and environmentally friendly way.
- Achieve a more inclusive workforce, which reflects the diverse communities we serve.
- Continuously improve using digital and data platforms to innovate and work smarter.
- Plan and deploy our resources based on risk.

## **10 Conclusions**

- 10.1 The documents presented to Community Safety Committee demonstrates how West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service have found innovative ways to make a positive contribution to reduce risk for the communities of West Yorkshire.





# Spotlight on...

## High Rise Evacuation Exercise

### “Exercise York House”



#### ➔ What was the need, how was it identified?

Since the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017 Fire Services across the country have developed policies and procedures for the safe and effective evacuation of large numbers of people from tall buildings in the event of an emergency.

West Yorkshire Fire Service introduced its Fire Survival and Evacuation Guidance document in November 2019 with training at the Highways buildings in Leeds and a series of presentations.

Fire Control, Evacuation Support crews and FDS Officers regularly undertake training to ensure that we would be effective in our response to a building evacuation.

An opportunity arose for us to train in a tall building within Bradford District which gave us the perfect scenario to test the new policy to its full alongside firefighting operations.

#### ➔ What did we do?

After initial discussions with the building owners, Incommunities Housing Association and our emergency partners it was decided that with the opportunity to use this building we would run four multi-agency exercises involving West Yorkshire Fire & Rescue, Yorkshire Ambulance Service, HART, West Yorkshire Police, Bradford Council Emergency Management Team and Incommunities.

We also involved Bradford College who provided us with some fantastic makeup artists for realistic burn injuries and with students and lecturers who would play the residents of the flats making calls into Fire Control.

Bradford Council Emergency Management Team wanted to involve their rest centre coordinators at Rockwell community Centre and the last exercise also involved

feeding injects into a short notice Local Resilience Forum exercise of the TCG.

Additionally, a team from the Home Office fed in a series of emergency calls to test the Control Room's ability to operate resiliently by employing operational Willowbeck. The feedback from this team was extremely positive.

students and lecturers that played their part in making the scenario as real as possible.

 Name Benjy Bush – District Commander

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### What difference did we make?

These exercises gave us a fantastic opportunity to test and improve our procedures in a realistic training environment from the initial call handling by fire Control operators through to the safe evacuation and confirmation of the residents out of the building.

Debriefs have been arranged following the exercises and any identified learning opportunities will be made to procedures which can only improve the safety of Firefighters responding to emergency incidents and the safety of our communities living in these buildings.

A multi-agency debrief is being coordinated through Bradford District to identify any learning points that can improve multi-agency response.

A thank you morning is being arranged at Bradford Fire Station for the college



### Contact



# Spotlight on...

## Community Water Awareness



### ➔ What was the need, how was it identified?

Year on year we are seeing a growing number of deaths nationally from drowning in our inland waterways. In West Yorkshire we have tragically seen a significant number of deaths over the last few years particularly around our river and canal networks.

In March we had incident in the Copley area where a lady fell into the river and was assisted by members of the public until emergency services arrived and successfully rescued her. Following this, a number of neighbourhood and community groups within the area approached the Calderdale District team for water safety advice and awareness.

To support these requests we explored further neighbourhood and community groups that would be interested in being involved in water safety awareness training along our water ways. We contacted businesses which operate along the water and those located near the water to see if they would be interested in the awareness sessions. Alongside this work we looked at what the main issues were when an incident

unfortunately did occur and how we could improve any of these.

### ➔ What did we do?

One of our Specialist Water Rescue Stations, Rastrick, delivered a water safety awareness course based on RLNI 'Water Responder Scheme'. The main areas covered were:

**Hazards** associated with water, cold water shock, mid & long-term immersion in water, fast flowing water, objects in the water, contamination and depth.

**Response**, Talk, reach, throw hierarchy and selecting a good site for rescue. The crew also ran through throw bag training, good stance, timing of throw and communication with the casualty.



**Prevention** Members of the public sharing the right information to the Fire Service. To support this we have placed signage at key locations across Calderdale, highlighting the specific location giving a clear general and what three words location. Should an incident occur one of the main issue identified across the service was ensuring members of the public “calling 999 and ask for Fire” and give a clear location.



### What difference did we make?

The delivery of water safety awareness training informed all members of the community who took part about the dangers of water and if they do come across someone in difficulty what actions could be taken. Rastrick have continued to develop this awareness training and will be continue to deliver it across the district.

Strategically placed prevention material is helping to provide increased water risk awareness to the community by providing posters to support key messaging and exact locations.

### What are the keys to our success?

Our success has been based around the use of information to highlight key areas of water risk and raising community awareness.

By ensuring that we support communities after an incident with awareness session, increasing their knowledge we can empower them to make a safe and positive intervention if needs be.


### What are we doing next?

We are continuing to deliver Water awareness training to West Yorkshire Police and Calderdale flood wardens and a range of business located near to our waterways in Calderdale. This training will increase the knowledge of the hazards associated with water safety, what information to pass to emergency services and how to respond in a safe manner if necessary.

### Contact

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# Spotlight on...

## YAS Student Paramedic Placement



### ➤ What was the need, how was it identified?

WYFRS have undertaken a series of YAS student placements at Huddersfield and Dewsbury fire stations. The paramedic students are spending a 12-hour shift with on-duty, operational firefighters.

The aim of the attachment is for the individuals to clearly understand the role of the fire and rescue service and to experience first-hand the types of incidents we attend and how we are deployed. Thus, gaining a greater understanding of the capability of our service and allowing for a greater delivery of care to the public while aligning with the JESIP principles for multi-agency working.

### ➤ What did we do?

Following the initial pilot, the watches involved designed a one-day program that would provide a great opportunity to develop and refine not just the students' skills but all those involved. The program incorporated all aspects of a firefighter role. The crews designed RTC, BA and firefighting training to allow individuals to experience the demands of the role. The students were also involved in all work routines performed by crews such as safe and well visits, equipment checks, community events and attended incidents.

The program will have seen thirty students experience the one - day placement.





### What are the keys to our success?

The key to the placements has been incorporating the paramedics into the regular day. This has enabled a building of relationships between the watches and the students.

The placements have seen a strong focus on development for all participants. The YAS students have brought their knowledge into our organisation too, with tips on casualty care for the individuals involved and providing first aid at some incidents.



### What are we doing next?

The program has been a success with great feedback from those involved both from YAS, Huddersfield university and the crews. We will look to continue and improve this program with further additions. We are also developing WYFRS casualty care watch instructors attending YAS exercises for improving their skillset.



### What difference did we make?

*The fantastic opportunity provided by WYFRS has allowed the student paramedics to understand the invaluable experience of collaborative working. We will be forever grateful to the fire service and hope to continue the placement for years to come.*

Ash Scaife

Course Leader Paramedic Science



### Contact



Name Dale Gardiner




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# Spotlight on...



## RNLI Waterside Responder Scheme



### What was the need, how was it identified?

In the last 12-month fire crews within Leeds District have rescued more than 20 people from water, with a large proportion of these rescues taking place along the river Aire within the city centre.

Crews at Leeds fire station have, for several years been promoting water safety across the city and have worked closely with the Local Council to install throwline boards across the city along the water's edge of the river Aire.




Leeds District in partnership with Kirklees District have identified the Royal National Lifeboat Institution's Waterside Responder

Scheme as an ideal way to continue to drive water safety within the districts and promote to the public the water rescue hierarchy of:

- Call
- Tell
- Throw

Along with the services current message:



## MAKE THE RIGHT CALL, CALL 999

### CALL

and ask  
for Fire and  
Rescue



### TELL

them to  
float on  
their back



### THROW

them  
something  
that floats



#RespectTheWater  
#BeWaterAware



## ➔ What did we do?

ADC Adam Garvey and ADC Chris Bell met with Simon Bristow, the Water Safety Education Manager for the North and East at the RNLI, to discuss the Waterside Responder Scheme and how we aimed to use it within service to continue our education on Water Safety.

Following this, Simon Bristow welcomed the opportunity to visit West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service to deliver a train the trainer session at Leeds Fire Station on Wednesday 17<sup>th</sup> May 2023.

On this day Simon delivered input during two sessions to fire crews from Leeds, Kirklees and Calderdale Districts.

The training was well received by crews and will enable those crews who attended to train other crews across the service to deliver the content to members of the public.



## ➔ What are we doing next?

Fire crews from Leeds and Rothwell who attended the training will now deliver the input to the other watches at Rothwell and Leeds fire stations in order to enhance our educational delivery potential.

Once this has been carried out Crews from Rothwell and Leeds will begin the roll out process of delivering water awareness input to partner agencies, starting with City centre Police officers and local policing teams in Rothwell.

Rothwell fire crews will then be delivering awareness sessions to our partners from the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, at St Aidans nature reserve, which

has become a popular open water swimming and gathered spot.

Following this, fire crews in Leeds are looking at the possibilities of delivering water awareness session to waterfront businesses along the river Aire, to increase water safety awareness.

## ➔ Contact




ADC Adam Garvey  
DPM Naomi Hirst



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# Spotlight on...



## Wakefield District – Taking Partnerships to the Next Level – June 2023



### ➔ What was the need, how was it identified?

Effective Partnerships enable the delivery of local solutions to local problems. Wakefield District have focused on negotiating a place within the Connect and Care multi-agency hubs which form an integrated care system across the communities of Wakefield.

This is a partnership between health, social care, housing providers, both private and statutory and voluntary organisations . The aim of which is to drive the integration of services to deliver supportive and co-ordinated person-centred care.

stakeholders from hospital trusts, mental health trusts, housing providers, carer support groups, dementia support groups, social care, GP practices and end of life providers .The vision is to ensure local people receive person centred care which is at the heart of our safe and well visits. This care to be delivered at the right time, in the right place and by the right person . We signed up to an effective information sharing agreement and this allows for the sharing of data, information, resources, learning and support to all the partner agencies within the group.

### ➔ What did we do?

We met with and established a place alongside the partners illustrated underneath the umbrella. These are

➔ What difference did we make?



Effective Referral Pathways  
ensuring Early Intervention and  
Prevention

➔ What are the keys to our success?

Development of strong working relationships with key stakeholders both internal and external



➔ What are we doing next?

We are continuing to embed the Water Safety Policy via the Wakefield Water Safety Group. The group was formed in 2020 as a multi-agency partnership to combat the trend of predominantly young people jumping into open water and locks within the district, risking both their lives and those tasked to save them. During an 18-month period over 120 water sites within the district were given new signage and flotation aids and water safety education was delivered to school, colleges, and street-based outreach groups. We are now seeing the launch in Wakefield of a hard-hitting water safety video which has been a collaboration of the key partners within the group.



We are also delivering an innovative form of water safety awareness. In a pilot led by WM Hames we have delivered cold water shock training to over 4000 16-18yrs olds in a controlled environment.

The sessions were well received by the colleges and we hope they will have a positive effect moving toward the summer period.



➔ Contact



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